Category Archive National Court

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Post-judgement Interest on debt and damages

What is post-judgement interest on debt and damages? What type on interest is this? The Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 makes provision for post-judgement on debt and damages.

What is post-judgement interest?

Post-judgement interest can apply to judgement by the court in cases involving a claim for debt or damages. In such a claim, the Court may make a finding for in favour of the claimant and consequently order for payment of the debt or the damages. When the Court makes such an order for payment, the judgement creditor must pay. If the judgement creditor does not pay, then interest would accrue from the date when the judgement is made until the date when the judgment debt is settled in full. This is post-judgement interest and it is covered under Section 6 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015.

Pre-judgement versus post-judgement interest

In Polem Enterprise Ltd v Attorney-General of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 20; SC1073 the Court comprising of Judges Kirriworm, Cannings and Manuhu set out the difference between a pre-judgement interest and post-judgement interest on debts and damages. A post-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date after the judgement is made to the date when the judgement is paid. On the other hand, pre-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date when the cause of action accrued to the date when the judgement is made.

There are two requirements that you must meet to claim post-judgement interest, and these are as follows:

  1. The Court must give a judgement or order for the payment of money.
  2. The Court must not make an order that post-judgement interest will not apply to the judgement.

Is post-judgement interest mandatory?

The short answer is yes. In Manus Fuel Distributors Ltd v Madang Provincial Government [2019] PGNC 57; N7789 Justice Cannings considered whether post-judgement interest is mandatory and found that the terms Section 6 of Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 are written in mandatory terms. Section 6 (1) states that “interest shall be payable at a fixed rate.” The use of the term “shall” signify that it is a mandatory requirement.

What is the interest rate?

In Manus Fuel Distributors Ltd v Madang Provincial Government [supra] Justice Cannings considered the interest rate applicable to post-judgement interest and noted that there is no prescribed rate in the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015. Hence, his Honour considered the circumstances on the case at hand and decided that the appropriate action, to take in that case, is to apply the same interest rate of 8% per annum that was applied, in that case, to the pre-judgement interest.

Although the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 does not provide s prescribed interest rate for pre-judgement interest, the National Court Rules 1983 makes provisions for it under Order 12 rule 6. This provision provides that where the Court make and order for payment of money and includes in that order the payment of interest, then pre-judgement interest shall be payable. This interest rate applicable is 8% per annum.

Does post-judgement interest apply to the State?

The short answer is yes, it does apply to the State. However, the interest rate differs from ordinary cases or judgement creditors. The interest rate applicable to the State should not exceed 2% per annum.

There is a prescribed procedure to that a judgement creditor must follow to claim post-judgement interest against the State. A summary of these procedures are as follows:

  1. Serve a certificate of judgement on the State.
  2. Serve a certificate of taxation on the State.
  3. These payments will be deemed to be made at the date of the drawing of the cheque.
  4. If there was an appeal and the judgement debt is increased, then post-judgement interests would only apply to the increase, and it will take effect on the date the appellate judgment was made.

Exceptions to the application of post-judgement interest

If the claim is based on Common Law, then the judgement creditor is not entitled to post-judgement interest if the judgement debtor pays the damages as ordered by the Court within 30 days from the date the Court order was served on him by the judgement debtor.

Furthermore, in a claim for damages based on Common Law, if the Court awards a fixed amount for costs against a party and that party pays that cost within 30 days of the Court order, interest will not apply to it. Another case is where the Court orders costs against a party, but it is not a fixed cost. The cost is subject to taxation. In such a case, interest is not applicable. In both cases, if the Court orders that interest would able that interest would apply. However, in the absence of specific court orders to this effect, interest would not apply.

In conclusion, post-judgement interest is a right of the judgement creditor and can only be set aside is the Court orders specially states that it does not apply. This type of interest only applies to debts and damages.

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Pre-Judgement interest on debt and damages

What is pre-judgement interest on debt and damages? What type on interest is this? The Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 makes provision for pre-judgement on debt and damages.

What is pre-judgement interest?

Pre-judgement interest can apply to judgement by the court in cases involving a claim for debt or damages. In such a claim, the Court may make a finding in favour of the claimant and consequently order for payment on interest at a fixed rate for a period on part or whole of the amount awarded. This is pre-judgement interest and it is covered under Section 4 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015.

The Court has the discretionary power to grant pre-judgement interest. In Polem Enterprise Ltd v Attorney-General of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 20; SC1073 the Court comprising of Judges Kirriworm, Cannings and Manuhu affirmed the four aspects of pre-judgement interest, as set out by Justice Bredmeyer in Cheong Supermarket Pty Ltd v Muro; New Guinea Cocoa (Export) Co v Kieta Plumbing & Constructions Pty Ltd; Intertex Patterns v Bougainville Enterprises Pty Ltd [1987] PGLawRp 489; [1987] PNGLR 24, that the Court has discretion and can decide on:

  1. Whether to grant interest at all?
  2. What interest rate to apply?
  3. Whether to grant interest on the whole or part of the debt or damages for which judgment has been given?
  4. What period will the interest apply to?

Is pre-judgement interest mandatory?

The short answer is no. Pre-judgement interest is not a mandatory right of the judgement creditor. It is a relief that is at the discretion of the Court. Pre-judgement interest is consequential to an order for payment of debt or damages. It cannot stand on it own.

In National Capital District Commission v Dademo [2013] PGSC 37; SC1260 the Court (Injia CJ, Sawong & Murray JJ) considered whether the award of pre-judgement interest. The Court affirmed the decision in Sausau v PNG Harbours Board [2007] PGNC 106; N3255 (Injia DCJ, as he then was) wherein the Court found that pre-judgement interest should be awarded as a matter of course but upon the discretion of the Court. Irrespective of whether the claimant pleaded it in the statement of claim or even if pleaded, whether he pursued at trial, he his entitled to pre-judgement interest as a matter of course. This is because pre-judgement interest is a relief that has its basis on law. It is available for the claimant to claim at the discretion of the Court.

Exercise of discretion by the Court

The Court is granted a wide discretion by Section 4 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 when it comes to awarding interest. The Court must consider these matters set out in in the case of National Capital District Commission v Dademo [supra] when exercising this discretion:

  1. Whether interest should be awarded for the type of damage in question? The Court could refuse to grant pre-judgement interest. The plaintiff does not have a right to an award of pre-judgement interest. It is not mandatory but discretionary.
  2. Whether interest has been pleaded and litigated? The Court can still award pre-judgement interest even if the claimant did not plead it or even if the claimant pleaded it but did not plead the interest rate. This is because, the award in pre-judgement interest is provided for by statute. It is consequential to the awarding of debt or damages as the main claim. However, the only exception is when a statute provides the interest rate for such a claim. In such as case, the claimant must plead the interest rate.
  3. If pre-judgement interest is to be awarded, the Court will consider whether interest should be awarded for the whole amount or a part of the amount. For example, if the court awarded damages in the sum of K10, 000.00. It has the discretionary to award interest on the entire sum of K10, 000.00 or its can only award interest on K2, 000.00 only.
  4. Whether the Court should award interest for the whole or a part of the period from the cause of action to the date of the judgement. This period may vary from case to case as it depends on the circumstances of each case. For example, the Court could grant interest from the date of the cause of action to the date of the judgement or it could grant interest from the date of the commencement of the Court proceedings to the date of the judgement.
  5. The Court would consider the appropriate interest rate to apply to the type of damage in question. In most cases, the Court awards interest at the rate of 8% per annum. However, it depends on the circumstances of each case and the type of damages awarded. For example, in 8% interest rate was applied to damages involving land and 4% to damages involving personal injuries.
  6. The Court will consider the actions of the parties in the proceedings. Whether parties have unreasonably delayed the disposition of the case in Court? If a party caused the delay, he should not be awarded interest on damages and likewise if it’s the other way around.
  7. Whether the Court has delayed in giving its jdugement beyonded the required period of 3 to 6 months after trial? In such a case, increase should not apply to the period after 6 months.
  8. The interest of justice, fairness, and equity.

Pre-judgement versus post-judgement interest

In Polem Enterprise Ltd v Attorney-General of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 20; SC1073 the Court comprising of Judges Kirriworm, Cannings and Manuhu set out the difference between a pre-judgement interest and post-judgement interest on debts and damages. A post-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date after the judgement is made to the date when the judgement is paid. On the other hand, pre-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date when the cause of action accrued to the date when the judgement is made.

Does pre-judgement interest apply to the State?

The short answer is yes, it does apply to the State. However, the interest rate differs from ordinary cases or judgement creditors. The interest rate applicable to the State should not exceed 2% per annum. For the State, the types of cases where interest should be granted is not limited to debts and damages but it is extended to cover proceedings that arising out of a breach of expressed or implied contract or mercantile usage. It does not matter whether contract or mercantile isage had a fixed interest rate higher than 2% per annum.

The interest rate against the State ought not be higher than 2%. If, however, a judgement is given and the pre-judgement interest is awarded against the State at a rate higher than 2%, then it is a nullity. This judgement is liable to be set aside and re-issued according to the law by the same judge who made the decision. To set aside this judgement, application must be made to the same judge by any of the following persons:

  1. Lawyer for the State.
  2. Registrar of the National Court, clerk or other proper officer of the Court by which the judgement was given,
  3. Any party to the proceedings.

In conclusion, pre-judgement interest can be awarded to the claimant upon discretion of the Court. This type of interest only applies to debts and damages.

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Conditional Orders

What are self-executing orders or conditional orders?

The principles governing conditional or self-executing orders have been settled in our jurisdiction. In Baing v PNG National Stevedores Pty Limited [2000] PGSC 1; SC627 (Sheehan Sawong Kirriwom JJ), the Court answered the question of what is a conditional order? An order is conditional if the terms of the order are conditional upon the happening of some event in the future. This means that parties to the proceeding must return to Court again for the Court to determine whether the event did occur or was there an act of non-compliance of the order by the parties required to the do the act.

The Court then relied on the Australian case of FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration [1988] HCA 13; [1988] 165 CLR 268 where the High Court of Australia considered, inter alia, the meaning and effect of conditional orders. Gaudron J at 289, said:

“A conditional order, of its nature, necessitates the exercise of the further judicial function of determining that the condition was not satisfied at the specified time”.

It is, therefore, clear that a conditional order by its very nature requires further judicial function of determining that the condition was not satisfied at the specified time.

Is a conditional order a final order?

The short answer is no, it is not a final order. Justice Kandakasi ( as he then was) clearly explained this in ToRobert v ToRobert [2004] PGNC 43; N2744 wherein his Honour followed the ruling in Baing v PNG National Stevedores Pty Limited [supra].

“The clear impression I gather from these authorities is that, self-executing or conditional orders are not final orders in themselves. Instead, they are a forewarning of what would happen if a party required to take certain actions or steps specified in such orders fails to take them within the time limits stipulated by such orders. Such orders are therefore, not an end in themselves but rather set conditions precedent for the entry of the order or judgment forewarned in these kinds of orders on the fulfilment of the condition specified in the order. Then where there is a satisfaction of the stipulated conditions, it entitles the party seeking its benefit to go back to the Court and demonstrate the satisfaction of the condition and there being no impediment to the grant of the orders or judgment already forewarned.

What does “further judicial function” entail?

Justice Kandakasi (as he then was) in ToRobert v ToRobert [2004] PGNC 43; N2744 discussed in detail what the Supreme Court meant by stating that further judicial function is required.

“That function is to determine a satisfaction or not of the condition stipulated in the self-executing or conditional order. If the exercise of that judicial function results in a determination in terms of a satisfaction of the conditions, the Court would then make the orders or enter the kind of judgment or orders forewarned. It follows clearly therefore that; there is no automatic coming into effect or issuance of the forewarned orders or judgment on the expiry of the set deadline. Given that, it appears clear to me that, it is a misnomer to describe the kind of orders under consideration as “self-executing” or “conditional orders.” They should instead be described as “condition imposing orders”.

How to invoke the Court’s further judicial function?

If a party to the proceeding alleges that the other party, to whom the Court directed the term of the conditional order, did not comply with the order, then that party must file a notice of motion. The motion must seek that judgement be entered against the defaulting party. That motion must be supported by an affidavit setting out the non-compliance of the defaulting party.

This will allow both or all parties to the proceeding have the opportunity to be heard before the Court makes a final decision on the satisfaction of the stipulated conditions and the consequence that should follow from a determination of that question. This is important because it might end a defaulting party’s claim or may mean judgment against the defaulting party. Hence, the Court must observe the principles of natural justice adopted and guaranteed under Section 59 of the Constitution by giving all parties the opportunity to be heard.

Other relevant cases

Read these cases for more insight on this topic:

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Alternative reliefsNa

Can a Plaintiff seek two (2) heads of relief at the same time? If yes, should the Court grant both reliefs? Should a Plaintiff seek the second relief in the alternate instead of seeking both reliefs? If so, should the Court grant the alternative relief instead of the main relief. This article will focus of relief sought in a claim based on breach of a contract.

This dilemma was first raised in the case of Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties Pty Ltd [1999] PGNC 112; N1863 where the Plaintiff sought two (2) heads of relief. The Plaintiff sought both specific performance of the contract and damages for breach of contract. Justice Hinchliffe took note that the Plaintiff sought these reliefs as separate heads of relief and not in the alternative. His Honour noted that the practice in Papua New Guinea to the seek such reliefs in the alternative and not together.

In Augwi Ltd v Xun Xin Xin [2014] PGSC 83; SC1616, the parties in this appeal entered into a contract of sale over a vacant piece of land that was owned by the Respondent. The purchase price for the land was agreed by the parties at the sum of K45,000.00. After the contract was given statutory approval under the Land Act, the Respondent refused to complete the contract citing, amongst other reasons, that there was a mistake as to the value of the land because its real value was K100,000.00. The appellant brought an action claiming specific performance and damages as alternative remedies. The trial judge found that the contract was valid and enforceable but declined to grant specific performance. Instead, the trial judge ordered damages to be assessed. The Appellant then appealed against the part of the judgment that relates to the choice of remedy. The Supreme Court (Injia, CJ, David & Gabi JJ) affirmed the position taken by Justice Hinchliffe in Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties Pty Ltd [supra] as follows:

“The choice of an appropriate remedy amongst the remedies claimed in an originating process is in the Court’s discretion. The appellant claimed damages as an alternative remedy in the statement of claim endorsed on the writ and it was open to the trial judge to consider damages as an alternative remedy. In Papua New Guinea, specific performance and damages in a contract for sale of land are available as alternate remedies but not both: Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties and Koang No.47 Ltd (1999) N1863. The question is whether the exercise of discretion was erroneous in the circumstances.” 

Discretion of the Court

The Court, in exercising its discretion to grant the appropriate relief, must ensure that certain requirements are met. As a general rule, a finding by the Court that a valid and enforceable contract for the sale of land is, at law, a precondition to the grant of the equitable remedy of specific performance. Specific performance, of a contract of sale of land, as an equitable remedy, must follow as a matter of course except where the circumstances of the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.

Exceptions to the Rule

The exceptions to the rule include a case where:

  1. the plaintiff is guilty of laches in bringing an action for specific performance.
  2. the subject matter of the contract no longer exists.
  3. As much as specific performance in a contract for sale of land is a right of the vendor against a defaulting purchaser, it is a right of the purchaser against a defaulting vendor.
  4. A valid contract for sale of land, enforceable by specific performance, exists irrespective of grant of statutory approval of the contract under the Land Act.
  5. there is no contract to be specifically performed.
  6. the contract is unenforceable because of non-compliance with statute of frauds legislation (Frauds and Limitations Act).
  7. there is lack of mutuality.

The Court in Augwi Ltd v Xun Xin Xin [supra] found that a mistake as to the value of the land is not amongst those recognized exceptions. A contract for the sale of land is a special contract that the law requires to be in writing. A vendor should not renege on the contract by disputing the contract price and refuse to complete the sale because he has, since entering, into the contract changed his mind on the selling price for a better offer. When a willing vendor and purchaser have freely entered into a valid and binding contract, a Court doing equity can compel, by an order of specific performance, an unwilling vendor to do what a willing vendor would do, and that is to complete the sale. Equity will come to the aid of the purchaser to compel an unwilling vendor to perform the contract by taking all necessary steps to complete the sale. The contract did not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that specific performance of a contract for sale of land must follow as a matter of course. The Court, therefore, found that the trial judge erred in his judgement to choose damages as a relief rather than specific performance. Hence, the appeal was allowed.

In Derwent Ltd v Pakena [2020] PGNC 77; N8294 (Justice David) and Papindo Trading Co Ltd v Tolopa [2023] PGNC 97; N10211 (Justice Dowa) affirmed and adopted the position applied in Augwi Ltd v Xun Xin Xin [supra] and in Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties Pty Ltd [supra]that in Papua New Guinea, specific performance and damages in a contract for sale of land are available as alternate remedies, but not both.

In conclusion, if a person is bringing a claim against another party based on breach of contract, it would be the best option to plead reliefs in the alternative. The Court can then deliberate on the law and evidence and award the most appropriate relief.

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Informal service through confirmation

What is informal service through confirmation? When does it apply? In Papua New Guinea, for any document that is filed in a court proceedings, it must be served on the other party. These documents may be served personally on the other parties. However, for some documents you do not need to serve it personally on the other party. There are some documents, however, that the National Court Rules 1983 specifically sets out that these documents must be served personally on the other parties. Some examples of these are:

  1. Originating process such as writ of summons and originating summons.
  2. Notice of motion or summons, statement of charge and affidavit in relation to contempt proceedings. 

If you are a plaintiff who had just filed a writ of summons in the National Court, but you cannot locate the defendant to serve on him personally the writ of summons, what would you do? The National Court Rules specifically states that originating processes such as a writ of summons must be served on the Defendant personally. Any other form of service is not acceptable.

Substituted service

When you are faced with such difficulties, the Rules allows you to apply to the Court to ask for orders that instead of service, you can take such other steps that will bring the court document to the notice of the defendant. To ask the court to make such an order, you must demonstrate to the court the difficulties that you faced in serving the court document that makes it impractical to comply with the rules for service. You can ask the Court for substituted service which usually involves publication of the court document in the newspaper. However, this can be costly.

Informal service through confirmation

The other option that you can use is apply to the Court to confirm service of the court document. You can do that by filing a notice of motion wherein you will seek this relief. You must accompany the motion with a supporting affidavit showing the attempts that you have made to serve on the defendant the court document formally. You must also show that you have served it informally. You will then ask the court of confirm that inform service.

In Titus v Tavarai [2018] PGNC 175; N7267 (Tamate J) the plaintiff sought leave of the court for either substituted service or informal service through confirmation. The plaintiff informed the court that he does not have the money to pay for the cost for publication in the newspaper should the court order substituted service through publication of the court document in the newspaper. Instead, the plaintiff opted for informal service through confirmation. The court considered that fact that the plaintiff has attempted to serve the document on various occasions on the defendant and thus confirmed that service on 14 November 2016 was sufficient.

In National Finance Ltd v Tapalai [2019] PGNC 239; N8044 (Makail J) the plaintiff made an application to confirm his informal service of the writ of summon via a Facebook post on the defendant’s Facebook wall. The Court, however, refused to confirm this informal service on the basis that it is hard to proof that the Facebook account belongs to the defendant. Furthermore, it is hard to tell if the person who responded to the post is the defendant. However, the Court did not say that service via social media would not be confirmed, instead it stated that it can be done but not too readily.

In conclusion, you can serve on the defendant or any party a court document if you have attempted to serve on the defendant formal but was unable and served on the defendant informally. The court can confirm this informal service.

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Substituted Service

What is substituted service? When does it apply? In Papua New Guinea, for any document that is filed in a court proceedings, it must be served on the other party. These documents may be served personally on the other parties. However, for some documents you do not need to serve it personally on the other party. There are some documents, however, that the National Court Rules 1983 specifically sets out that these documents must be served personally on the other parties. Some examples of these are:

  1. Originating process such as writ of summons and originating summons.
  2. Notice of motion or summons, statement of charge and affidavit in relation to contempt proceedings. 

If you are a plaintiff who had just filed a writ of summons in the National Court, but you cannot locate the defendant to serve on him personally the writ of summons, what would you do? The National Court Rules specifically states that originating processes such as a writ of summons must be served on the Defendant personally. Any other form of service is not acceptable. When you are faced with such difficulties, the Rules allows you to apply to the Court to ask for orders that instead of service, you can take such other steps that will bring the court document to the notice of the defendant.

To ask the court to make such an order, you must demonstrate to the court the difficulties that you faced in serving the court document that makes it impractical to comply with the rules for service.

Procedure to apply for substituted service

You will file a notice of motion setting out the order for substituted service. You will also file an affidavit with the notice of motion setting out the grounds you are relying on to make the application. The affidavit must set foth the difficulties you had in serving the court documents. It must show the attempts that you took in serve the court documents on the defendants.

In Chief Collector of Taxes v Dickson Panel Works Pty Ltd and Davis Consolidated Pty Ltd [1988] PGLawRp 29 (Bredmeyer J) the Court plaintiff served the writ for unpaid income tax to one of the defendants via the registered post office. Thereafter, the Chief Collector entered default judgement. One of the defendants applied to set aside the judgement on the basis that the writ that was served to the registered office was the old address. The defendant no longer uses this address. The court thus set aside the default judgement but stated that a corporation should not be able to escape service by having no current address or registered post address. The plaintiff can always apply for substituted service.

Mode of substituted service

Once an application is made to the court and if the Court orders substituted service, then you will comply with the orders of the Court. In practice, most substituted service is done through publication of the court document in the daily newspaper. It is only proper to publish it in any of the newspaper which has a nationwide distribution so that it expands the possibility of the defendant sighting the publication in the newspaper. In Titus v Tavarai [2018] PGNC 175; N7267 (Tamate J) the Court acknowledged that publication in the newspapers is the practice today for substituted service.

In conclusion, if you have a difficult time serving the court document on a party in a proceeding, you can apply to the court for substituted service.

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Personal Service of Court Documents

What is personal service of court documents? If you are a Plaintiff who had just filed a Writ of Summons in the National Court, what is the method that you must employ to serve the court document on the defendant. In Papua New Guinea, for any document that is filed in a court proceedings, it must be served on the other party. These documents may be served personally on the other parties. However, for some documents you do not need to serve it personally on the other party. There are some documents, however, that the National Court Rules 1983 specifically sets out that these documents must be served personally on the other parties. Some examples of these are:

  1. Originating process such as writ of summons and originating summons.
  2. Notice of motion or summons, statement of charge and affidavit in relation to contempt proceedings.  

How to effect personal service on an individual?

If you filed a writ of summons against an individual, you must serve it on the Defendant personally. That means that you must hand over the document to the defendant and he himself must receive it. However, if he refused to accept the writ, you must leave a copy down in his presence. Thereafter, you must tell him the nature of the document.

In Pansat Communications Pty Ltd v Mai [1995] PNGLR 438 (Sawong AJ) the plaintiff served on the defendant the writ of summons. The process served handed the writ of summons to the defendant who took it and read it. Thereafter, he handed the writ of summons back to the process server. The Court found that her was personally served the writ of summons. The fact that he handed it back to the process server is irrelevant. Furthermore, the Court found that handing back the writ of summons does not amount to declining service.

How to effect personal service on a corporation?

The National Court Rules 1983 provides under Order 6 rule 3 (2) that if you filed a writ of summons against a corporation, you must serve it on the corporation personally. You can do that through serving it personally on the mayor, chairman or president of the corporation or on the town clerk, clerk, secretary, treasurer, or other similar officers of the corporation. That means that you must hand over the document to the defendant and he himself must receive it on behalf of the corporation. However, if he refused to accept the writ, you must leave a copy down in his presence and tell him the nature of the document.

The National Court Rules 1983, however,  provides under Order 6 rule 2 (1) that all originating process must be served personally on each defendant unless there is a legislation that states that it should not be served personally or it provides other methods for service. A good example of this is Section 431 of the Companies Act 1997 which provides that you can serve any court document in a proceeding, such as a writ, summons, notice, or order, against an incorporation in the following ways:

  1. by delivery to a person named as a director or the secretary of the company on the register.
  2. by delivery to an employee of the company at the company’s head office or principal place of business.
  3. by leaving it at the company’s registered office or address for service.
  4. by posting it to the company’s registered office, or address for service or postal address.
  5. by serving it in accordance with any directions as to service given by the court having jurisdiction in the proceedings.
  6. in accordance with an agreement made with the company.
  7. by serving it at an address for service given in accordance with the rules of the Court having jurisdiction in the proceedings or by such means as 7a solicitor has, in accordance with those rules, stated that the solicitor will accept service.

These seven methods set out about are the only method by which you can serve a court document on a corporation in Papua New Guinea. In Kitika v Mitina [2021] PGNC 479; N9340 (Eliakim AJ) found service on an unauthorized officer of the corporation at a branch that is neither the registered office nor the principal place of business is not service.

In Wong v Haus Bilas Corp Pty Ltd [1988-89] PNGLR 42 (Andrew AJ) the Court set aside a default judgement because it discovered that it made this judgement upon the mistaken belief that service was effected properly on the defendant who is a incorporation. The plaintiff served the writ on the accountant of the defendant at an office that is not the registered office of the defendant. Hence, it is not sufficient service on the accountant on the defendant.

Service on defendants named in a group

How do you effect serve on defendants who are named in the proceedings as a group? Do you serve the document to only one of the defendants in the group? The short answer to this in no, you serve is on each of the named defendants. You must serve it personally on each one. In Tima v Korohan [2006] PGNC 21; N3045, the plaintiffs named four (4) defendants in a group. He then served one copy of the writ of summons on only one of the defendants. The Court held that personal service was not effected on the other three (3) defendants. The service of one defendant named in a group is not sufficient to say that it is personal service on all defendants named in a group. Each must be service personally.

In conclusion, personal service must be effected on each defendant personally as per Order 6 rule 2 and 3 of the Rules and if there are legislations that makes provision for service then service must be in accordance with those legislations for each specific matter.

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Transfer of proceedings

Once pleadings in a proceedings is closed, a party may file a notice at the Registry wherein the party will request that the proceedings be set down for trial. This notice is Form 40 provided in Schedule 1 of the National Court Rules 1983. The notice in Form 40 shall state the following details:

  1. The place of trial.
  2. Whether the proceedings are to be set down for trial generally or for the trial of specified issues.

The party filing a Form 40 must serve the sealed copy of the notice on the same day on the other party or parties. That party must serve this notice on the address of service of the other parties. However, the practice now is that, no Notice to Set Down for Trial will be filed unless it is consented to by all parties to the proceedings. This is to ensure that all parties have agreed that the matter is ready for trial after the completion for pleadings and other interlocutory matters. An application may be made to the Court for a dispensation of the required consent, if a party unnecessarily and without good reasons withholds consent to the Notice to set down for trial (see Dogoliv v Laho [2005] PGNC 47, Sawong J; N2885 and Bank of South Pacific Ltd v Piari [2005] PGNC 181; N3245, Lay J).

Trial of the proceedings shall take place at the place as set out in the sealed Form 40. However, the Court may appoint some other place within Papua New Guinea for trial of the proceedings to be conducted. The Court can do that:

  1. On application by a party to the proceedings; or
  2. By the Court’s own motion.

If a party makes an application to have trial conducted in some other place, then that party must satisfy a test before the Court grants its application to transfer the proceedings. Justice Hartshorn in Newman v Melpa Properties Ltd [2017] PGNC 376; N7069 dealt with an application under Order 10 Rule 2 (2) by the Defendant wherein the Defendant sought to transfer the proceedings from the Waigani National Court to the Mt Hagen National Court. The Defendant in that case submitted that the proceeding should be transferred as there are special circumstances which were as follows:

  1. the office of the defendant is in Mount Hagen;
  2. the property the subject of the proceeding is in Mt Hagen;
  3. the residential address of the plaintiff is in Mt Hagen;
  4. the parties’ witnesses are all in Mt Hagen;
  5. the cause of action of the plaintiff is in Mount Hagen; and
  6. no prejudice will be caused to either party if the proceeding is transferred to Mt Hagen National Court and there will not be any delay; and
  7. there are other proceedings that have been commenced by the defendant against the plaintiff concerning the subject property at the Mt Hagen National Court.

Justice Hartshorn adopted the test in the Australian case of National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation [1988] FCA 133; (1988) 83 ALR 434 where the Court stated that the tests to apply to transfer proceedings is “Where can the case be conducted or continued most suitably, bearing in mind the interests of all the parties, the ends of justice in the determination of the issues between them, and the most efficient administration of the court?”. At page 43, the Court, after commenting that the power conferred on the Court or Judge by section 48 of the Federal Court Act was wholly unfettered, said that:

“The factors which the court is entitled to take into account in considering whether one city is more appropriate than another for interlocutory hearings or for the trial itself are numerous. The court must weigh those factors in each case. Residence of parties and of witnesses, expense to parties, the place where the cause of action arose and the convenience of the court itself are some of the factors that may be relevant in particular circumstances.

By the Court in National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation [1988] FCA 133; (1988) 83 ALR 434

The balance of convenience will generally be a relevant consideration, but not necessarily determinative of each case. A party commences a proceeding by filing an application in a particular registry of the court. If that party or another party wishes to have the proceeding conducted or continued in another place he may apply to the court for an order …. as the case may be. There is no onus of proof in the strict sense to be discharged by the party seeking to conduct or continue the proceedings elsewhere. Its starting point is that the proceeding has been commenced at a particular place. Why should it be changed? On the one hand, if the party who commenced the proceeding chose that place capriciously the court would be justified in giving no weight to the choice of place. At the other end of the scale, a proceeding may have continued for some time at the place of commencement with many steps having been taken there, for example, filing of pleadings and affidavits, discovery and inspection. Due weight would be given by the court to such matters before directing that the proceeding should continue at a different place.

By the Court in National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation [1988] FCA 133; (1988) 83 ALR 434

The balance of convenience is important, but its weight must vary from case to case. Ultimately the test is: where can the case be conducted or continued most suitably, bearing in mind the interests of all the parties, the ends of justice in the determination of the issues between them, and the most efficient administration of the court? It cannot and should not, in our opinion, be defined more closely or precisely.”

By the Court in National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corporation [1988] FCA 133; (1988) 83 ALR 434

In conclusion, the above test must be satisfied by the Applicant for the Court to exercise its discretion to transfer the proceedings to another place.

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Adding parties to a proceedings

Can you add parties to a proceedings? The short answer is yes. The National Court Rules 1983 make provision for this under Order 5.

Who can apply to the Court to add a party to a proceedings? Order 5 rules 8 of the Rules allows for three (3) persons to add a party to a proceedings. These three (3) are as follows:

  1. the person who ought to be joined as a party.
  2. Any party to the proceedings.
  3. The Court.

The Court may add a party upon its on motion. The first two (2) persons must make an application to the Court to add a party to the proceedings. This application must be supported by evidence filed before the Court by way of an affidavit. The evidence must show that:

  1. The person ought to be a party to the proceedings.
  2. Adding that person is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the proceedings can be effectively and completely adjudicated upon.

Once such an application is made, the Court will rely on the following principles as set out in Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Limited [2010] PGNC 175; N4158 (Cannings J) and Timbers PNG Ltd v Papua New Guinea Forest Authority [2012] PGNC 30; N4638 (Hartshorn J),  to decide whether to order that a person be added as a party to the proceedings:

  1. whether the applicant has sufficient interest in the proceeding.
  2. whether the applicant’s joinder as a party is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the proceeding can be effectively and completely adjudicated upon.

In determining whether the applicant has sufficient interest in the proceedings the Court will look at the following considerations:

  1. any relief is sought against the proposed party.
  2. the plaintiff opposes the application for joinder.
  3. the proposed party will be affected if the relief sought in the statement of claim is granted.
  4. the joinder of the proposed party is necessary to satisfy any orders made in the proceeding.

In Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Limited [supra] the plaintiff applied to the Court to add 10 persons as plaintiff. The defendant objected to this application, generally against all 10 persons on that basis that they do not have sufficient interest in the proceedings. Justice Cannings, in determining, this application set out the relevant considerations set out above. His Honour found that nine (9) of the ten (10) persons had sufficient interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Hence, his Honour granted the application and allowed the nine (9) persons to be joined as a party. This case is an example of an application made by any party to the proceedings to add another party to the proceedings.

In Timbers PNG Ltd v Papua New Guinea Forest Authority [supra] a person who was not a party to a proceedings made an application to be joined as a party to the proceedings. The person applied to be joined in the proceedings as the third defendant. Justice Hartshorn considered the application and found that the person does not have sufficient interest in the outcome of the proceedings to be joined as a party. Hence, his Honour refused to grant the reliefs sought to be added as a party. This case is an example of an application made by a person who applied to join on the believe that he thought he ought to be joined as a party.

In the case of adding a party as a plaintiff, that person must give his consent to be added as a plaintiff to the proceedings. If he did not give his consent, he should not be added as a plaintiff. In Medaing v Ramu Nico Management (MCC) Limited [supra] Justice Cannings refused to add one (1) out of the ten (10) person because the applicant did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he has given his consent. Hence, his was not added as a party.

In conclusion, an applicant must satisfy those requirements set out above to be added as a party to the proceedings.

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Next Friend

A disabled person can only make a claim or bring a proceedings for relief in the National Court through a next friend. A disabled person is a minor or a mentally disordered person. If, on the other hand, the disabled person is to defend or intervene or appear in any proceedings under order then the disabled person can only do that through his guardian at law. A guardian at law means the guardian of a defendant who is a disabled person. The disabled person may, by his next friend, commence, carry on or defend any claim in a proceedings for relief.

Any person can be a next friend except a disabled person and a corporation. However, a person may not be a next friend if that person has an interest that is adverse to the interest of the disabled person. Furthermore, in order for a person to be a next friend, he must give his consent to be next friend. A person cannot take any step in any proceedings as next friend for a disabled person unless he files, beforehand, at the National Court Registry, the following documents:

  1. his consent to act as next friend of the disabled person in the proceedings.
  2. a certificate by his solicitor that the next friend has no interest in the proceedings adverse to that of the disabled person.

In Kagl v Baki, Secretary Department of Education [2008] PGNC 40; N3318, the proceedings was commenced by a next friend of a disabled person. This disabled person is mentally disordered. The next friend filed the proceedings without filing a consent to act for the disabled person and filing a certificate by the solicitor. The Court ordered default judgement and the matter returned before the Court for assessment of damages. Thereafter, the Defendant raised the issue of compliance with requirement under the Rules for acting as next friend for a disabled person. His Honour, Justice Kandakasi (as he then was) dealt with the following two (2) issues:

  1. whether the proceedings are correctly on foot in light of the non-compliance of the rules?
  2. whether the signing of default judgment is a bar to considering the validity of the proceedings and defendant’s liability?

Justice Kandakasi (as he then was), after considering the law and the evidence dismissed the proceedings on the following basis:

“The provisions of O 5 rr 21(6) and 22(3) are clear. These provisions stipulate that, no person purporting to be a next of friend can take any step in any proceedings until the required consent and certificates have first been filed. These requirements are in mandatory terms and are important and necessary to ensure that the proceedings or any steps that are taken for a disabled person is indeed for the benefit of the disabled person and not otherwise. By reason of his or her disability, a disabled person may not be able to fend for him or herself and hence, could easily be taken advantage of by other persons purporting to represent them. Thus, the need for the Court to ensure that, the next friend is indeed acting for and in the best interest of a disabled person. The consent of the next of friend and the lawyer’s certificate provides the necessary basis for the Court to be satisfied that the proceedings are indeed for the benefit of a disabled person. Accordingly, no proceedings can be issued and maintained purportedly for and on behalf of a disabled person, unless the requirements in question are met.

Justice Kandakasi (as he then was) in Kagl v Baki, Secretary Department of Education [2008] PGNC 40; N3318

It is, therefore, a prerequisite requirement to file these documents prior to instituting a proceedings as next friend of a disabled person. As these requirements are in mandatory terms, failure to comply will raise the issue of whether the Court has the jurisdiction to deal with a proceeding. His Honour, Justice Kandakasi (as he then was) in Kagl v Baki, Secretary Department of Education [supra] addressed the issue on competency of the proceedings as follows:

The failure to provide the consent and the certificates at the first place and the failure to correctly fix the defects, goes into Mr Boi Gabriel’s ability to initially issue, then pursue and maintain these proceedings. It also goes into the jurisdiction of the Court in the matter. To the extent that the required consents and certificates have not been given prior to the issuance, the pursuance and the maintaining of these proceedings, the Court would have no jurisdiction to allow the matter to go any further. In my view, this is not a simple non compliance of the rules which can be cured under O 1 r 7. The non compliance is a fundamental one given the reasons for the requirements which I have briefly noted above.

It is now clear law that, the issue of competency of any proceedings before the Court is an open issue. As such, the issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on the Court’s own initiative. In the absence of a proper consent to act and certification from the plaintiff’s lawyer as required, the proceedings are not correctly before me. This alone forms the foundation for a dismissal of the proceedings.

Justice Kandakasi (as he then was) in Kagl v Baki, Secretary Department of Education [Supra]

In Kewa v Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd [2011] PGNC 162; N4440, Justice Makail stated that the requirements of Order 5, rules 21 and 22 are mandatory in a case where a plaintiff is a disable person. A failure to comply with these requirements would render the proceeding incompetent and can be struck out.

In conclusion, the requirements of Order 5 Division 2 must be complied in a proceedings commenced by a next friend of a disabled person. The non-compliance of these Rules may render the entire proceedings incompetent.

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