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Understanding Reasonable Grounds for Arrest Under the Arrest Act (Chapter 339)

The Arrest Act (Chapter 339) defines the conditions under which a person can be arrested on reasonable grounds. Understanding this provision is crucial for both law enforcement and the public. This blog post explores the concept of “reasonable grounds” in the context of arrests, ensuring clarity and legal compliance.

What Constitutes Reasonable Grounds for Arrest?

Definition of Reasonable Grounds

The Act states that a person believes something on reasonable grounds if:

  1. The person personally holds that belief.
  2. There are reasonable grounds for that belief.

This means that the belief must be both subjective (personally held) and objective (supported by factual evidence).

Subjective Belief

The policeman or arresting officer must genuinely believe that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offence. This personal belief is essential for initiating the arrest.

Objective Grounds

Beyond personal belief, there must be objective facts or evidence supporting this belief. These reasonable grounds ensure that the arrest is justified and not arbitrary.

Real-World Examples

Example 1: Suspicious Activity Leading to Theft

A policeman observes an individual loitering near a parked car and acting nervously. The person then breaks the car window and attempts to steal items from inside. The policeman arrests the individual based on both his personal belief and the objective evidence of the crime being committed.

Example 2: Preventing a Fight

During a festival, a policeman notices an individual arguing aggressively with others and making threats. The officer believes the person is about to start a physical fight. The belief is based on the person’s behavior and the situation’s context. The policeman arrests the individual to prevent the fight, demonstrating both subjective belief and reasonable grounds.

Importance of Reasonable Grounds in Arrests

Legal Protection

The requirement for reasonable grounds protects individuals from arbitrary arrests. It ensures that arrests are made based on factual evidence and genuine belief, promoting fairness and justice.

Law Enforcement Efficiency

For law enforcement, understanding and applying the concept of reasonable grounds is vital for effective policing. It allows officers to act swiftly and decisively while adhering to legal standards.

Conclusion

The Arrest Act (Chapter 339) clearly outlines what constitutes reasonable grounds for arrest. This dual requirement of personal belief and objective evidence ensures that arrests are legally justified and protect individual rights. Understanding these provisions helps both law enforcement and the public maintain trust in the legal system. It ensures transparency, accountability, and the protection of fundamental rights in Papua New Guinea.

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Post-judgement Interest on debt and damages

What is post-judgement interest on debt and damages? What type on interest is this? The Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 makes provision for post-judgement on debt and damages.

What is post-judgement interest?

Post-judgement interest can apply to judgement by the court in cases involving a claim for debt or damages. In such a claim, the Court may make a finding for in favour of the claimant and consequently order for payment of the debt or the damages. When the Court makes such an order for payment, the judgement creditor must pay. If the judgement creditor does not pay, then interest would accrue from the date when the judgement is made until the date when the judgment debt is settled in full. This is post-judgement interest and it is covered under Section 6 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015.

Pre-judgement versus post-judgement interest

In Polem Enterprise Ltd v Attorney-General of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 20; SC1073 the Court comprising of Judges Kirriworm, Cannings and Manuhu set out the difference between a pre-judgement interest and post-judgement interest on debts and damages. A post-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date after the judgement is made to the date when the judgement is paid. On the other hand, pre-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date when the cause of action accrued to the date when the judgement is made.

There are two requirements that you must meet to claim post-judgement interest, and these are as follows:

  1. The Court must give a judgement or order for the payment of money.
  2. The Court must not make an order that post-judgement interest will not apply to the judgement.

Is post-judgement interest mandatory?

The short answer is yes. In Manus Fuel Distributors Ltd v Madang Provincial Government [2019] PGNC 57; N7789 Justice Cannings considered whether post-judgement interest is mandatory and found that the terms Section 6 of Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 are written in mandatory terms. Section 6 (1) states that “interest shall be payable at a fixed rate.” The use of the term “shall” signify that it is a mandatory requirement.

What is the interest rate?

In Manus Fuel Distributors Ltd v Madang Provincial Government [supra] Justice Cannings considered the interest rate applicable to post-judgement interest and noted that there is no prescribed rate in the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015. Hence, his Honour considered the circumstances on the case at hand and decided that the appropriate action, to take in that case, is to apply the same interest rate of 8% per annum that was applied, in that case, to the pre-judgement interest.

Although the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 does not provide s prescribed interest rate for pre-judgement interest, the National Court Rules 1983 makes provisions for it under Order 12 rule 6. This provision provides that where the Court make and order for payment of money and includes in that order the payment of interest, then pre-judgement interest shall be payable. This interest rate applicable is 8% per annum.

Does post-judgement interest apply to the State?

The short answer is yes, it does apply to the State. However, the interest rate differs from ordinary cases or judgement creditors. The interest rate applicable to the State should not exceed 2% per annum.

There is a prescribed procedure to that a judgement creditor must follow to claim post-judgement interest against the State. A summary of these procedures are as follows:

  1. Serve a certificate of judgement on the State.
  2. Serve a certificate of taxation on the State.
  3. These payments will be deemed to be made at the date of the drawing of the cheque.
  4. If there was an appeal and the judgement debt is increased, then post-judgement interests would only apply to the increase, and it will take effect on the date the appellate judgment was made.

Exceptions to the application of post-judgement interest

If the claim is based on Common Law, then the judgement creditor is not entitled to post-judgement interest if the judgement debtor pays the damages as ordered by the Court within 30 days from the date the Court order was served on him by the judgement debtor.

Furthermore, in a claim for damages based on Common Law, if the Court awards a fixed amount for costs against a party and that party pays that cost within 30 days of the Court order, interest will not apply to it. Another case is where the Court orders costs against a party, but it is not a fixed cost. The cost is subject to taxation. In such a case, interest is not applicable. In both cases, if the Court orders that interest would able that interest would apply. However, in the absence of specific court orders to this effect, interest would not apply.

In conclusion, post-judgement interest is a right of the judgement creditor and can only be set aside is the Court orders specially states that it does not apply. This type of interest only applies to debts and damages.

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Pre-Judgement interest on debt and damages

What is pre-judgement interest on debt and damages? What type on interest is this? The Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 makes provision for pre-judgement on debt and damages.

What is pre-judgement interest?

Pre-judgement interest can apply to judgement by the court in cases involving a claim for debt or damages. In such a claim, the Court may make a finding in favour of the claimant and consequently order for payment on interest at a fixed rate for a period on part or whole of the amount awarded. This is pre-judgement interest and it is covered under Section 4 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015.

The Court has the discretionary power to grant pre-judgement interest. In Polem Enterprise Ltd v Attorney-General of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 20; SC1073 the Court comprising of Judges Kirriworm, Cannings and Manuhu affirmed the four aspects of pre-judgement interest, as set out by Justice Bredmeyer in Cheong Supermarket Pty Ltd v Muro; New Guinea Cocoa (Export) Co v Kieta Plumbing & Constructions Pty Ltd; Intertex Patterns v Bougainville Enterprises Pty Ltd [1987] PGLawRp 489; [1987] PNGLR 24, that the Court has discretion and can decide on:

  1. Whether to grant interest at all?
  2. What interest rate to apply?
  3. Whether to grant interest on the whole or part of the debt or damages for which judgment has been given?
  4. What period will the interest apply to?

Is pre-judgement interest mandatory?

The short answer is no. Pre-judgement interest is not a mandatory right of the judgement creditor. It is a relief that is at the discretion of the Court. Pre-judgement interest is consequential to an order for payment of debt or damages. It cannot stand on it own.

In National Capital District Commission v Dademo [2013] PGSC 37; SC1260 the Court (Injia CJ, Sawong & Murray JJ) considered whether the award of pre-judgement interest. The Court affirmed the decision in Sausau v PNG Harbours Board [2007] PGNC 106; N3255 (Injia DCJ, as he then was) wherein the Court found that pre-judgement interest should be awarded as a matter of course but upon the discretion of the Court. Irrespective of whether the claimant pleaded it in the statement of claim or even if pleaded, whether he pursued at trial, he his entitled to pre-judgement interest as a matter of course. This is because pre-judgement interest is a relief that has its basis on law. It is available for the claimant to claim at the discretion of the Court.

Exercise of discretion by the Court

The Court is granted a wide discretion by Section 4 of the Judicial Proceedings (Interest on Debts and Damages) Act 2015 when it comes to awarding interest. The Court must consider these matters set out in in the case of National Capital District Commission v Dademo [supra] when exercising this discretion:

  1. Whether interest should be awarded for the type of damage in question? The Court could refuse to grant pre-judgement interest. The plaintiff does not have a right to an award of pre-judgement interest. It is not mandatory but discretionary.
  2. Whether interest has been pleaded and litigated? The Court can still award pre-judgement interest even if the claimant did not plead it or even if the claimant pleaded it but did not plead the interest rate. This is because, the award in pre-judgement interest is provided for by statute. It is consequential to the awarding of debt or damages as the main claim. However, the only exception is when a statute provides the interest rate for such a claim. In such as case, the claimant must plead the interest rate.
  3. If pre-judgement interest is to be awarded, the Court will consider whether interest should be awarded for the whole amount or a part of the amount. For example, if the court awarded damages in the sum of K10, 000.00. It has the discretionary to award interest on the entire sum of K10, 000.00 or its can only award interest on K2, 000.00 only.
  4. Whether the Court should award interest for the whole or a part of the period from the cause of action to the date of the judgement. This period may vary from case to case as it depends on the circumstances of each case. For example, the Court could grant interest from the date of the cause of action to the date of the judgement or it could grant interest from the date of the commencement of the Court proceedings to the date of the judgement.
  5. The Court would consider the appropriate interest rate to apply to the type of damage in question. In most cases, the Court awards interest at the rate of 8% per annum. However, it depends on the circumstances of each case and the type of damages awarded. For example, in 8% interest rate was applied to damages involving land and 4% to damages involving personal injuries.
  6. The Court will consider the actions of the parties in the proceedings. Whether parties have unreasonably delayed the disposition of the case in Court? If a party caused the delay, he should not be awarded interest on damages and likewise if it’s the other way around.
  7. Whether the Court has delayed in giving its jdugement beyonded the required period of 3 to 6 months after trial? In such a case, increase should not apply to the period after 6 months.
  8. The interest of justice, fairness, and equity.

Pre-judgement versus post-judgement interest

In Polem Enterprise Ltd v Attorney-General of Papua New Guinea [2010] PGSC 20; SC1073 the Court comprising of Judges Kirriworm, Cannings and Manuhu set out the difference between a pre-judgement interest and post-judgement interest on debts and damages. A post-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date after the judgement is made to the date when the judgement is paid. On the other hand, pre-judgement interest is the interest on debts and damages that is calculated from the date when the cause of action accrued to the date when the judgement is made.

Does pre-judgement interest apply to the State?

The short answer is yes, it does apply to the State. However, the interest rate differs from ordinary cases or judgement creditors. The interest rate applicable to the State should not exceed 2% per annum. For the State, the types of cases where interest should be granted is not limited to debts and damages but it is extended to cover proceedings that arising out of a breach of expressed or implied contract or mercantile usage. It does not matter whether contract or mercantile isage had a fixed interest rate higher than 2% per annum.

The interest rate against the State ought not be higher than 2%. If, however, a judgement is given and the pre-judgement interest is awarded against the State at a rate higher than 2%, then it is a nullity. This judgement is liable to be set aside and re-issued according to the law by the same judge who made the decision. To set aside this judgement, application must be made to the same judge by any of the following persons:

  1. Lawyer for the State.
  2. Registrar of the National Court, clerk or other proper officer of the Court by which the judgement was given,
  3. Any party to the proceedings.

In conclusion, pre-judgement interest can be awarded to the claimant upon discretion of the Court. This type of interest only applies to debts and damages.

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Amendment of Statement

Can a statement that is filed pursuant to Order 16 Rule 3 (2) in a judicial review proceedings be amended? In short, yes it can be amended.

At the outset, it is crucial to know and understand the judicial review process is a special process. Hence, there is a specific set of rules in the National Court Rules 1983 that deals specifically with judicial review proceedings. This set of rules is Order 16. The provisions of Order 16 only apply to judicial review proceedings and no other provisions in the National Court Rules is applicable.

Jurisdiction for amendments

If a Plaintiff wants to amend the Order 16 Statement (Statement), he has two occasions in the proceeding to amend it. These occasions are set out under Order 16 as follows:

  1. Order 16 rule 3 (4): at the time of making the application for leave for judicial review.
  2. Order 16 rule 6 (2): at the time of hearing the substantive notice of motion.

Amendment of Statement at hearing of Leave for judicial review

A plaintiff who wants to amend the statement can apply at the time of hearing the application for leave to apply for judicial review. He can make this application under order 16 rule 3 (4) to amend the statement. The Court can deal with such application by granting orders for amendment to include:

  1. Different grounds.
  2. Additional grounds.
  3. Orders apart from the above two that the Court thinks is it fit.

The grounds for a judicial review application are as follows:

  1. Ultra vires or lack of jurisdiction.
  2. Breach of procedures prescribed by statute.
  3. Acting under dictation.
  4. Real or apprehended bias.
  5. Bad faith.
  6. Inflexible application of government policy.
  7. Considering irrelevant considerations.
  8. Failing to consider relevant considerations.
  9. Extraneous or improper purpose.
  10. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness.

Amendment of Statement at hearing of judicial review

A plaintiff who wants to amend the statement can apply at the time of hearing of judicial review. He can make this application under order 16 rule 6 2) to amend the statement. The Court may allow the plaintiff to amend his statement. However, Order 16 does not provide a set criteria in which the plaintiff can satisfy to the Court before the Court can grant leave to the plaintiff to amend his statement.

In Dads Investment Corporation Ltd v Samson [2023] PGSC 134; SC2485 the Court, comprising of the Deputy Chief Justice Kandakasi, and judges Murray and Kangwia dealt with an appeal which raised the point of amendment of statement after leave was granted by the Court. In this appeal, the primary learned judge refused to grant leave to the Appellant to amend the Statement. The Appellant, in the Court below, applied to amend the Statement after leave for judicial review was granted. The Court considered Order 16 rule 6 (2) and stated as follows:

“… a plaintiff in a judicial review proceeding has the right under the relevant provisions to apply for leave to amend his or her O.16 statement. However, it should be noted that all such amendments are restricted to and for the purpose of “specifying different or additional grounds for relief or otherwise”. Unfortunately, there is no prescription anywhere in O.16 as to when and how the application should be made and most importantly, the relevant criteria of any such amendments.”

The Court in Dads Investment Corporation Ltd v Samson [2023] PGSC 134; SC2485

Conventional criteria for amendment of pleading

The Court noted the absence of set criteria for amendment under Order 16. Hence, the Court affirmed the approach taken by the Court in Barrick (Niugini) Ltd v Nekitel [2020] PGSC 96; SC2007 whereby the Court held that the conventional criteria for amendment of pleadings in other National Court are applicable in Order 16. This convention criteria are set out in Papua Club Inc v Nusaum Holdings Ltd [2002] PGNC 50; N2273, Kewa v Kombo [2004] PGNC 83; N2688 and Tambe v Tamsen [2004] PGNC 66; N2714. The convention criteria for amendment of pleadings are as follows:

  1. Will the amendment enable the Court to determine the real questions in controversy between the parties?
  2. Will the amendment correct any defect or error in the proceedings?
  3. Will the amendment cause real prejudice or injustice to the other party?
  4. Is the application for such amendment made mala fide or bona fide?
  5. Can the other party be fairly compensated with costs for the amendment?
  6. Is the party prevented by its conduct or the manner in which the proceedings have progressed from being permitted to amend its pleadings?
  7. Where do the interests of justice lie?
  8. Is the proposed amendment efficacious? That is, is it a proper amendment?

It is not necessary to satisfy all these criteria for leave to be granted. It depends on the circumstances on each case. In Dads Investment Corporation Ltd v Samson [supra] the Court held that you can apply the following criteria but you do not have to satisfy all of them:

  1. whether the amendment will enable the Court to determine the real questions in controversy between the parties or correct any defect or error in the proceedings.
  2. whether the proposed amendments will not result in injustice and prejudice to the other party.
  3. whether the application is not made mala fide and that the other party will be compensated with costs for such amendments.

All in all, Order 16 does not provide specific provisions for the criteria that the court could use to determine whether a Plaintiff can amend a statement. In the absence of such, the case laws cited as allowed for a plaintiff to satisfy the conventional criteria for amendments before the court can grant leave to amend a statement.

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Conditional Orders

What are self-executing orders or conditional orders?

The principles governing conditional or self-executing orders have been settled in our jurisdiction. In Baing v PNG National Stevedores Pty Limited [2000] PGSC 1; SC627 (Sheehan Sawong Kirriwom JJ), the Court answered the question of what is a conditional order? An order is conditional if the terms of the order are conditional upon the happening of some event in the future. This means that parties to the proceeding must return to Court again for the Court to determine whether the event did occur or was there an act of non-compliance of the order by the parties required to the do the act.

The Court then relied on the Australian case of FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration [1988] HCA 13; [1988] 165 CLR 268 where the High Court of Australia considered, inter alia, the meaning and effect of conditional orders. Gaudron J at 289, said:

“A conditional order, of its nature, necessitates the exercise of the further judicial function of determining that the condition was not satisfied at the specified time”.

It is, therefore, clear that a conditional order by its very nature requires further judicial function of determining that the condition was not satisfied at the specified time.

Is a conditional order a final order?

The short answer is no, it is not a final order. Justice Kandakasi ( as he then was) clearly explained this in ToRobert v ToRobert [2004] PGNC 43; N2744 wherein his Honour followed the ruling in Baing v PNG National Stevedores Pty Limited [supra].

“The clear impression I gather from these authorities is that, self-executing or conditional orders are not final orders in themselves. Instead, they are a forewarning of what would happen if a party required to take certain actions or steps specified in such orders fails to take them within the time limits stipulated by such orders. Such orders are therefore, not an end in themselves but rather set conditions precedent for the entry of the order or judgment forewarned in these kinds of orders on the fulfilment of the condition specified in the order. Then where there is a satisfaction of the stipulated conditions, it entitles the party seeking its benefit to go back to the Court and demonstrate the satisfaction of the condition and there being no impediment to the grant of the orders or judgment already forewarned.

What does “further judicial function” entail?

Justice Kandakasi (as he then was) in ToRobert v ToRobert [2004] PGNC 43; N2744 discussed in detail what the Supreme Court meant by stating that further judicial function is required.

“That function is to determine a satisfaction or not of the condition stipulated in the self-executing or conditional order. If the exercise of that judicial function results in a determination in terms of a satisfaction of the conditions, the Court would then make the orders or enter the kind of judgment or orders forewarned. It follows clearly therefore that; there is no automatic coming into effect or issuance of the forewarned orders or judgment on the expiry of the set deadline. Given that, it appears clear to me that, it is a misnomer to describe the kind of orders under consideration as “self-executing” or “conditional orders.” They should instead be described as “condition imposing orders”.

How to invoke the Court’s further judicial function?

If a party to the proceeding alleges that the other party, to whom the Court directed the term of the conditional order, did not comply with the order, then that party must file a notice of motion. The motion must seek that judgement be entered against the defaulting party. That motion must be supported by an affidavit setting out the non-compliance of the defaulting party.

This will allow both or all parties to the proceeding have the opportunity to be heard before the Court makes a final decision on the satisfaction of the stipulated conditions and the consequence that should follow from a determination of that question. This is important because it might end a defaulting party’s claim or may mean judgment against the defaulting party. Hence, the Court must observe the principles of natural justice adopted and guaranteed under Section 59 of the Constitution by giving all parties the opportunity to be heard.

Other relevant cases

Read these cases for more insight on this topic:

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Alternative reliefsNa

Can a Plaintiff seek two (2) heads of relief at the same time? If yes, should the Court grant both reliefs? Should a Plaintiff seek the second relief in the alternate instead of seeking both reliefs? If so, should the Court grant the alternative relief instead of the main relief. This article will focus of relief sought in a claim based on breach of a contract.

This dilemma was first raised in the case of Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties Pty Ltd [1999] PGNC 112; N1863 where the Plaintiff sought two (2) heads of relief. The Plaintiff sought both specific performance of the contract and damages for breach of contract. Justice Hinchliffe took note that the Plaintiff sought these reliefs as separate heads of relief and not in the alternative. His Honour noted that the practice in Papua New Guinea to the seek such reliefs in the alternative and not together.

In Augwi Ltd v Xun Xin Xin [2014] PGSC 83; SC1616, the parties in this appeal entered into a contract of sale over a vacant piece of land that was owned by the Respondent. The purchase price for the land was agreed by the parties at the sum of K45,000.00. After the contract was given statutory approval under the Land Act, the Respondent refused to complete the contract citing, amongst other reasons, that there was a mistake as to the value of the land because its real value was K100,000.00. The appellant brought an action claiming specific performance and damages as alternative remedies. The trial judge found that the contract was valid and enforceable but declined to grant specific performance. Instead, the trial judge ordered damages to be assessed. The Appellant then appealed against the part of the judgment that relates to the choice of remedy. The Supreme Court (Injia, CJ, David & Gabi JJ) affirmed the position taken by Justice Hinchliffe in Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties Pty Ltd [supra] as follows:

“The choice of an appropriate remedy amongst the remedies claimed in an originating process is in the Court’s discretion. The appellant claimed damages as an alternative remedy in the statement of claim endorsed on the writ and it was open to the trial judge to consider damages as an alternative remedy. In Papua New Guinea, specific performance and damages in a contract for sale of land are available as alternate remedies but not both: Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties and Koang No.47 Ltd (1999) N1863. The question is whether the exercise of discretion was erroneous in the circumstances.” 

Discretion of the Court

The Court, in exercising its discretion to grant the appropriate relief, must ensure that certain requirements are met. As a general rule, a finding by the Court that a valid and enforceable contract for the sale of land is, at law, a precondition to the grant of the equitable remedy of specific performance. Specific performance, of a contract of sale of land, as an equitable remedy, must follow as a matter of course except where the circumstances of the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.

Exceptions to the Rule

The exceptions to the rule include a case where:

  1. the plaintiff is guilty of laches in bringing an action for specific performance.
  2. the subject matter of the contract no longer exists.
  3. As much as specific performance in a contract for sale of land is a right of the vendor against a defaulting purchaser, it is a right of the purchaser against a defaulting vendor.
  4. A valid contract for sale of land, enforceable by specific performance, exists irrespective of grant of statutory approval of the contract under the Land Act.
  5. there is no contract to be specifically performed.
  6. the contract is unenforceable because of non-compliance with statute of frauds legislation (Frauds and Limitations Act).
  7. there is lack of mutuality.

The Court in Augwi Ltd v Xun Xin Xin [supra] found that a mistake as to the value of the land is not amongst those recognized exceptions. A contract for the sale of land is a special contract that the law requires to be in writing. A vendor should not renege on the contract by disputing the contract price and refuse to complete the sale because he has, since entering, into the contract changed his mind on the selling price for a better offer. When a willing vendor and purchaser have freely entered into a valid and binding contract, a Court doing equity can compel, by an order of specific performance, an unwilling vendor to do what a willing vendor would do, and that is to complete the sale. Equity will come to the aid of the purchaser to compel an unwilling vendor to perform the contract by taking all necessary steps to complete the sale. The contract did not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that specific performance of a contract for sale of land must follow as a matter of course. The Court, therefore, found that the trial judge erred in his judgement to choose damages as a relief rather than specific performance. Hence, the appeal was allowed.

In Derwent Ltd v Pakena [2020] PGNC 77; N8294 (Justice David) and Papindo Trading Co Ltd v Tolopa [2023] PGNC 97; N10211 (Justice Dowa) affirmed and adopted the position applied in Augwi Ltd v Xun Xin Xin [supra] and in Mondo Merchants Pty Ltd v Melpa Properties Pty Ltd [supra]that in Papua New Guinea, specific performance and damages in a contract for sale of land are available as alternate remedies, but not both.

In conclusion, if a person is bringing a claim against another party based on breach of contract, it would be the best option to plead reliefs in the alternative. The Court can then deliberate on the law and evidence and award the most appropriate relief.

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Informal service through confirmation

What is informal service through confirmation? When does it apply? In Papua New Guinea, for any document that is filed in a court proceedings, it must be served on the other party. These documents may be served personally on the other parties. However, for some documents you do not need to serve it personally on the other party. There are some documents, however, that the National Court Rules 1983 specifically sets out that these documents must be served personally on the other parties. Some examples of these are:

  1. Originating process such as writ of summons and originating summons.
  2. Notice of motion or summons, statement of charge and affidavit in relation to contempt proceedings. 

If you are a plaintiff who had just filed a writ of summons in the National Court, but you cannot locate the defendant to serve on him personally the writ of summons, what would you do? The National Court Rules specifically states that originating processes such as a writ of summons must be served on the Defendant personally. Any other form of service is not acceptable.

Substituted service

When you are faced with such difficulties, the Rules allows you to apply to the Court to ask for orders that instead of service, you can take such other steps that will bring the court document to the notice of the defendant. To ask the court to make such an order, you must demonstrate to the court the difficulties that you faced in serving the court document that makes it impractical to comply with the rules for service. You can ask the Court for substituted service which usually involves publication of the court document in the newspaper. However, this can be costly.

Informal service through confirmation

The other option that you can use is apply to the Court to confirm service of the court document. You can do that by filing a notice of motion wherein you will seek this relief. You must accompany the motion with a supporting affidavit showing the attempts that you have made to serve on the defendant the court document formally. You must also show that you have served it informally. You will then ask the court of confirm that inform service.

In Titus v Tavarai [2018] PGNC 175; N7267 (Tamate J) the plaintiff sought leave of the court for either substituted service or informal service through confirmation. The plaintiff informed the court that he does not have the money to pay for the cost for publication in the newspaper should the court order substituted service through publication of the court document in the newspaper. Instead, the plaintiff opted for informal service through confirmation. The court considered that fact that the plaintiff has attempted to serve the document on various occasions on the defendant and thus confirmed that service on 14 November 2016 was sufficient.

In National Finance Ltd v Tapalai [2019] PGNC 239; N8044 (Makail J) the plaintiff made an application to confirm his informal service of the writ of summon via a Facebook post on the defendant’s Facebook wall. The Court, however, refused to confirm this informal service on the basis that it is hard to proof that the Facebook account belongs to the defendant. Furthermore, it is hard to tell if the person who responded to the post is the defendant. However, the Court did not say that service via social media would not be confirmed, instead it stated that it can be done but not too readily.

In conclusion, you can serve on the defendant or any party a court document if you have attempted to serve on the defendant formal but was unable and served on the defendant informally. The court can confirm this informal service.

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